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The new trade theory emphasizes the role of market-share reallocations across firms (“stealing”) in
driving productivity growth, while the older literature focused on average productivity improvements
(“learning”). We use comprehensive, firm-level data from India’s organized manufacturing sector
to show that market-share reallocations did play an important role in aggregate productivity gains
immediately following the start of India’s trade reforms in 1991. However, aggregate productivity
gains during the overall 20-year period from 1985 to 2004 were driven largely by improvements in
average productivity. By exploiting the variation in reforms across industries, we document that the
average productivity increases can be attributed to India’s trade liberalization and FDI reforms. Finally,
we construct a panel dataset that allows us to track firms during this time period; our results suggest
that while within-firm productivity improvements were important, much of the increase in average
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The new trade theory stresses the importance of market-share reallocations in increasing aggregate
productivity following a trade liberalization (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003, Melitz
2003). In contrast, the earlier literature emphasized the idea that trade could improve average
productivity among existing ﬁrms (Corden 1974, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Helpman and
Krugman 1985, for example). Yet there are few empirical studies that quantify the relative impor-
tance of average productivity gains versus gains from market-share reallocations in the wake of a
major trade liberalization.
In this paper, we use a comprehensive, ﬁrm-level dataset that allows us to examine the role
played by market-share reallocations in aggregate productivity growth in India’s organized man-
ufacturing sector from 1985 to 2004.1 In 1991, India embarked on a series of reforms, including
a major trade liberalization. We conﬁrm that market-share reallocations were an important source
of productivity growth in the years immediately following the start of the 1991 reforms, but not
during other periods.
WedocumentthreedistinctphasesinIndia’smanufacturingproductivityduringtheperiodfrom
1985 to 2004. During this time, aggregate productivity (deﬁned as output-weighted, mean ﬁrm
productivity) grew by nearly 20%. From 1985 to 1990, the growth in aggregate productivity was
driven by “learning” - that is, an increase in unweighted, average ﬁrm productivity. This measure
of learning captures the change in productivity for the average ﬁrm, and therefore includes not only
changes in productivity among surviving ﬁrms, but also changes in average productivity that can be
attributed to ﬁrm entry and exit. In the period immediately following the start of the reforms (1991-
1994), the “stealing” of market share - that is, the reallocation of market share from less productive
to more productive ﬁrms - became more important than learning in driving aggregate productivity
growth. In the longer run (1998-2004), learning once again became the more important factor in
aggregate productivity growth, with stealing (reallocation) contributing little. During the 20-year
1The organized (formal) manufacturing sector in India consists of ﬁrms that are registered under Sections 2m(i)
and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act; all ﬁrms with 20 or more employees (10 if power is used) are required to register. The
organized sector accounts for approximately 80% of manufacturing sector output, though only 20% of employment.
2period from 1985 to 2004 as a whole, we ﬁnd that most of the increase in aggregate productivity
can be explained by improvements in average productivity.
We then examine the extent to which individual policy reforms were associated with these
productivity gains. In particular, we exploit variations in tariff cuts, foreign direct investment
(FDI) liberalization, and industrial licensing reforms across industries to examine the contribution
of each reform to overall growth. We ﬁnd that the average decline in ﬁnal goods tariffs during
this time period implies a 3.2% increase in aggregate productivity, while the average decline in
input tariffs implies a 21.8% increase. Moreover, the FDI liberalization also accounts for a 2.2%
increase in aggregate productivity.
Finally, although ﬁrm identiﬁers are not available for the organized sector data during most
of the time period we study, we construct a panel dataset by matching individual ﬁrms from one
year of the survey to the next. This panel allows us to examine the relative importance of within-
ﬁrm changes, versus ﬁrm entry and exit, in explaining average productivity growth. When we
attempt to isolate within-ﬁrm changes in average productivity by controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed
effects, we ﬁnd that the impacts of the input tariff and FDI liberalizations on average productivity
are strongly attenuated, though still economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Our results suggest
that although within-ﬁrm productivity growth is important, a substantial fraction of the average
productivity increase that is attributable to these policies is also due to ﬁrm entry and exit.
Our study was motivated by the emphasis that the new trade theory places on the importance of
market-share reallocations in increasing aggregate productivity. Although a number of papers have
tested various implications of this literature (see, for example, Arkolakis (forthcoming), Bernard et
al. (2003), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), Berthou and Fontagne (2010), Eaton, Kortum and
Kramarz (2008), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Manova and Zhang (2010)), few are able to
directly test the effect of a trade liberalization episode on market-share reallocations, and existing
evidence on the role of reallocation is mixed. For example, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) ﬁnd that
the reallocation of market share to relatively low-cost ﬁrms explained little of the overall change in
productivity following Mexico’s trade liberalization; however, Pavcnik (2002) and Menezes-Filho
3and Muendler (2007) ﬁnd that market-share reallocation was an important driver of productivity
growth following trade reforms in Chile and Brazil, respectively. Treﬂer (2004) documents that
a fall in Canadian tariffs increased industry-level labor productivity, but not within-plant labor
productivity, which he interprets as evidence that reallocation was more important than within-
plant improvements. In Colombia, Fernandes (2007) ﬁnds that average productivity gains were
more important than reallocation, but that reallocation became important in many industries during
periodsoftariffliberalization. WeaddtothisliteraturebyshowingthatinthecaseofIndia, market-
share reallocations were important, but only during the period immediately following the start of
the trade reforms.
Our study also contributes to the substantial body of work examining India’s 1991 reforms.
Topalova and Khandelwal (forthcoming) establish that the reductions in ﬁnal goods and input tar-
iffs increased productivity among approximately 4,000 large, publicly listed manufacturing ﬁrms.
Sivadasan (2009) uses a dataset that is similar to ours for the early years of the reforms (1986-1994)
and ﬁnds that the reduction in ﬁnal goods tariffs and the FDI liberalization increased productiv-
ity. He also documents that the ﬁnal goods tariff and FDI liberalizations were linked with average
productivity increases, but not reallocation, in the early 1990’s. Nataraj (2010) compares the reac-
tions of the organized and unorganized manufacturing sectors to trade liberalization, and ﬁnds that
while the reduction in ﬁnal goods tariffs increased productivity signiﬁcantly among unorganized
ﬁrms, the reduction in input tariffs was more important in increasing organized sector productiv-
ity. Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2008) ﬁnd that following the removal of licensing
requirements, the number of factories and output increased, particularly in states with relatively
less restrictive labor regulations.
Our study is distinguished from previous literature on the 1991 reforms in several ways. First,
we document that market-share reallocations were important to overall productivity growth im-
mediately following the start of the 1991 reforms, while average productivity gains were more
important during the periods from 1985-1990 and 1998-2004. Second, we show that the trade
and FDI liberalizations explain a substantial amount of overall productivity growth. Third, our
4construction of a panel of ﬁrms allows us to show that a large share of the increase in average
productivity appears to be due to ﬁrm entry and exit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on the
Indian reforms; Section 3 describes the data and outlines the construction of the panel of ﬁrms;
Section 4 discusses the empirical framework and presents results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 The 1991 Reforms
Prior to 1991, India had a highly restrictive trade regime, with average ﬁnal goods tariffs on man-
ufactured products of approximately 95%, as well as non-tariff barriers on most goods. FDI was
capped at 40% for most industries, and large manufacturing ﬁrms were required to obtain oper-
ating licenses. During the 1980s, India began to liberalize its licensing policies to some extent,
removing licensing requirements from approximately one-third of industries; however, trade and
FDI restrictions remained in place. India’s ﬁscal deﬁcit continued to grow during this time, as did
its balance of payments deﬁcit.
In 1991, a combination of economic and political shocks - namely, a rise in oil prices, a de-
crease in remittances and lower demand from abroad, and an unstable political climate - created
a balance of payments crisis (Topalova and Khandelwal forthcoming). A new government re-
quested help from the IMF, which was granted on the condition that India undertake several re-
forms (Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy 2007). In July 1991, the government announced a series
of major policy changes, including FDI liberalization, exchange rate liberalization, the removal of
the requirement for operating licenses in most industries (“delicensing”), the removal of import
licensing requirements for capital and intermediate goods, and a reduction and harmonization of
tariffs across industries. Many of these policy changes were formalized in India’s Eighth Five-Year
Plan (1992-97).
Between 1991 and 1997, the average ﬁnal goods tariff rate on manufactured products fell from
95% to 35% (Panel (a) of Figure 1). Not only did average tariffs fall, but tariffs were also har-
5monized across industries; therefore, the industries with the highest pre-reform tariffs faced the
highest tariff cuts. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows a negative, linear relationship between an industry’s
pre-reform tariff level and the change in tariffs through 1997.2 After the Eighth Five-Year Plan
(post-1997), India continued to lower its tariffs, though the reductions were no longer as uniform.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that tariffs for some industries were even increased during this time.
Panel (c) of the same ﬁgure indicates that if we compare tariff changes through 2004 with pre-
reform tariffs, the negative relationship exhibited through 1997 still holds, although there are a few
more outliers.
In addition to ﬁnal goods tariffs, we also consider the impact of input tariffs on productivity.
We calculate input tariffs using India’s Input-Output Transactions Table, following the method
suggested by Amiti and Konings (2007). For example, if the footwear industry derives 80% of
its inputs from the leather industry and 20% from the textile industry, then the input tariff for the
footwear industry is 0.8 times the ﬁnal goods tariff for the leather industry plus 0.2 times the ﬁnal
goods tariff for the textile industry. In our baseline measure of input tariffs, we use both traded and
non-traded inputs, assigning tariff rates of zero to non-traded inputs.3
One potential concern with including input tariffs in our empirical analysis is that ﬁnal goods
and input tariffs may be highly correlated, thus leading to multicollinearity problems in estima-
tion. Panel (d) of Figure 1 shows the relationship between the change in ﬁnal goods tariffs and the
change in input tariffs for a given industry. Though the two measures are related, there are a num-
ber of industries that received relatively large reductions in ﬁnal goods tariffs but relatively small
reductions in input tariffs, and vice versa. Moreover, the overall correlation coefﬁcient between
ﬁnal goods and input tariffs (across years and industries) is 0.7. Within years, the correlation coef-
ﬁcient is even lower (less than 0.5 in all years), which suggests that multicollinearity is not likely
to be a signiﬁcant problem.
We also consider two other policy changes that occurred during this period: the removal of in-
2Section 4.6 shows that excluding the two industries that do not ﬁt this pattern does not affect the results.
3In Section 4.6, we present results from an alternative measure of input tariffs that considers only manufacturing
sector inputs.
6dustrial licensing requirements and the allowance of FDI into most industries without case-by-case
approval. Until the 1980s, India’s “license raj” required every ﬁrm with more than 50 employees
(100 employees without power) and a certain amount of assets to obtain an operating license. The
license speciﬁed, among other things, the amount of output a ﬁrm could produce, the types of
goods it could make, and its location. In 1985, approximately one-third of industries were “deli-
censed” (the requirement for a license was dropped); in 1991, most industries were delicensed as
part of the broader reforms package (Aghion et al. 2008). The restrictions on foreign investment
were also liberalized during the 1990’s. Prior to 1991, FDI was capped at 40% for most industries;
beginning in 1991, FDI inﬂows of up to 51% were allowed in selected industries with “automatic”
approval (Sivadasan 2009).
By the end of 1991, nearly 85% of industries had been delicensed. The licensing requirement
was removed from several additional industries in subsequent years, and by the end of the 1990’s,
over 90% of industries had been delicensed. In contrast, the FDI liberalization occurred somewhat
more slowly: only one-third of industries were FDI liberalized in 1991. A few additional industries
were liberalized by 1997, but it was not until 2000 that the government indicated that all indus-
tries would be eligible for automatic FDI approval, except those requiring an industrial license or
meeting several other conditions. Table 1 shows the evolution of the reforms over time.
The fact that most of these policy changes occurred as part of an externally-required reforms
package lowers the chance that industries were selected into the reforms based on political factors.
In addition, to the extent that industries with certain characteristics may have been more likely
to be liberalized, we use a ﬁxed-effects estimation strategy that should address any time-invariant
characteristics that could have affected selection. However, if the reforms are correlated with pre-
reform trends in industry characteristics, then our results may be biased. To evaluate the potential
extent of this bias, we examine the correlations between changes in reforms (1990-2004) and pre-
reform trends in industry characteristics (1985-1989). We follow Topalova and Khandelwal (forth-
coming) and consider a number of industry characteristics including wage, share of production
workers, capital-labor ratio, total employment and output, and ﬁrm size (average employment).
7We also consider pre-reform trends in total factor productivity (TFP). Table A.1 indicates that
there are no statistically signiﬁcant correlations between pre-reform trends in industry characteris-
tics and future reforms. Moreover, in Section 4.6 we show that our results are robust to limiting our
analysis to the period through 1997; since these initial reforms were largely carried out as outlined
in the Eighth Five-Year Plan, which was developed in the wake of the 1991 crisis, they are even
less likely to be subject to potential selection issues than reforms in later years.
3 Data
3.1 Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) Data
The primary dataset we use is ﬁrm-level surveys from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).
The period of coverage for each ASI survey is the accounting year that ended on any day during
the ﬁscal year: the 1985-86 survey (which we refer to as the 1985 survey) refers to the factory’s
accounting year that ended on any day between April 1, 1985 and March 31, 1986. We obtained
ﬁrm-level data for all available years between 1985 and 2004. Data were not available for 1995.
In addition, the way in which input data were collected and made available for the years 1996
and 1997 did not make it possible to construct certain key variables for those two years that were
consistent with the other years. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to the ﬁrm-level data for the
remaining 17 years between 1985 and 2004 (1985 through 1994 and 1998 through 2004).
The sampling universe for the ASI is all ﬁrms that are registered under Sections 2m(i) and
2m(ii) of the Factories Act, as well as ﬁrms registered under the Bidi & Cigar Workers Act, and
a number of utility and service providers. We include only manufacturing ﬁrms in our analysis.
All ﬁrms that have 20 or more employees (10 or more employees if a power source is used) are
required to register.4 The sampling frame is derived from the registry list of each state’s Chief
4Although ﬁrms with fewer than 10 employees are not required to register under this act, and therefore should not
appear in the sampling universe, between 15% and 20% of the ASI ﬁrms in each year report fewer than 10 employees.
These ﬁrms may be registered for various reasons, including the possibility that they used to have more than 10
employees but shrank; that they plan to grow in the future; and that registering may be a signal to creditors or other
business partners.
8Inspector of Factories, and all but four small states are covered.
The ASI divides ﬁrms into two sectors - the “census” sector, in which ﬁrms are surveyed every
year, and the “sample” sector, in which ﬁrms are sampled every few years. Between 1985 and
2004, the inclusion of ﬁrms in the census and sample sectors, as well as the sampling strategy,
changed several times. To ensure that our analysis is consistent over time and is representative of
the population of ﬁrms, we apply the sampling multiplier weights that are provided for each ﬁrm.
Each unit surveyed is generally a factory; however, if an owner has two factories in the same
state, sector (census versus sample) and industry, a joint return can be furnished. In the population
of ﬁrms, fewer than 2% of the observations report more than one factory, and we will use the term
“ﬁrm” to mean one observation in our dataset.5
The key variables we construct from the ASI data are output, material input, labor, and capital.6
We drop closed ﬁrms from the dataset, and we include only ﬁrms with positive values of the key
variables. To address a few extreme outliers, we also trim the top 0.5% of output and material input
values.
We deﬂate output using industry-speciﬁc wholesale price indices (WPI) from the Government
of India’s Handbook of Industrial Statistics. Similarly, our material input measures are deﬂated by
constructing deﬂators using the WPI along with India’s 1993-94 Input-Output Transactions Table.
Labor is measured as the total number of people employed by the ﬁrm. For the baseline analysis,
we deﬂate the book value of capital by the WPI for machinery. In Section 4.6, we show that our
results are robust to measuring capital using the perpetual inventory method described in Harrison
(1994), as modiﬁed by Sivadasan (2009).
Summary statistics for the population are presented in Table 2. Only open ﬁrms that have
positive values of our key variables are included. Sampling weights are applied to the summary
statistics in the ﬁrst column, so the results are representative of the overall organized sector. The
second column shows results for the ﬁrms that were sampled, without applying sampling weights.
5We tested the robustness of our results to including only observations that report one factory. Results are not
presented here as they are virtually identical to baseline results.
6Output includes the ex-factory value of products, the increase in the stock of semi-ﬁnished goods, and the value
of own construction; material input includes material and fuel.
9Since larger ﬁrms are surveyed more often than smaller ﬁrms, the mean and median values of
output, capital, material inputs, and labor are much larger in the sampled population rather than
the estimated population.
3.2 Creating a Panel
The ASI data provide unique ﬁrm identiﬁers beginning in 1998. However, it has not previously
been possible to track ﬁrms prior to 1998, and thus to follow them during the most signiﬁcant
period of reforms. As discussed in Harrison (2009), we overcome this challenge by matching
individual ﬁrms from one year of the survey to the next between 1985 and 1998. We then combine
this constructed panel with the pre-formed panel provided by the ASI from 1998-2004.
We construct our panel in three steps. First we pair ﬁrms that appear in consecutive years. We
search for exact duplicates in Open and Close values between one year and the next (e.g. we look
for a match between the Close value in 1985 and the Open value in 1986) in one of the following
six variables: stock of raw materials, fuels, and stores; stock of semi-ﬁnished goods; stock of
ﬁnished goods; inventory; loans; and ﬁxed capital. We only consider matches with more than four
non-zero digits. In the case of multiple potential matches, we take the pair that matches the largest
number of digits over the six variables, with a minimum match of six digits, implying an exact
match in least two matching variables.
We apply this technique from 1985-1994 and from 1996-1998. After 1998 we use the pre-
formed panel. However, the detailed data for 1995 have not been released. To link ﬁrms over this
gap year, we consider matches within state, 2-digit industry code, and permanent serial number.
Though the ASI provides a permanent serial number for each ﬁrm, this number is not unique; how-
ever, we ﬁnd that the numbers are consistent across previously matched ﬁrms from 1990 onwards.
We therefore use the permanent serial number along with state and industry codes to bridge the gap
in 1995. We validate matches by checking the year of initial production and growth in labor, ﬁxed
capital and fuels. For labor forces of less than 1,000 employees, we use observed growth rates in
labor among known matches to develop a nonlinear relationship between labor force observed one
10year and labor force observed the following year. We then require potential pairs in non-adjacent
years to fall within the 10th and 90th percentiles of this observed labor force growth. For ﬁxed
capital and fuels we allow for one standard deviation of positive or negative growth. Based on our
analysis of the pre-formed panel, for the year of initial production we allow for variation of up to
two years, as well as switched tens and ones digits (e.g. 1984 is allowed to replace 1948).
We then extend the technique used to bridge the gap across 1995 to other years, in order to
match broken series to each other and to unmatched observations. We consider matching any
series with an exact match in terms of state, 2-digit industry code, and permanent serial number.7
We apply the same labor, ﬁxed capital, and fuels checks that we performed when bridging the gap
in 1995, only allowing a successful match to fail one of these checks.
From 1985 to 1994, and in particular from 1985 to 1989 when permanent serial numbers are
rarely consistent across more than two years for known matches, we iterate a similar procedure
using exact district code matches. The mapping of district codes to geographical regions changes
frequently over the period of our survey, so we generate a concordance of district codes over time,
using existing concordances as well as the changing codes observed in our known panel matches.8
Since we observe each ﬁrm’s year of initial production, we are conﬁdent that we can correctly
identify survivors and entrants in our panel. However, given the substantial fraction of ﬁrms that
are not surveyed every year, we are more reserved about our ability to identify exiting ﬁrms. The
rates of exit that we observe in our panel are signiﬁcantly higher than the rates that we extrapolate
from the observed distribution of year of initial production. Therefore, in estimating productiv-
ity, we avoid methods that rely on accurately identifying ﬁrm exits, and instead employ an index
number method that is robust to potentially spurious exit. In Section 4.4, we exploit the fact that
we can conﬁdently identify surviving ﬁrms to examine the extent to which average productivity
improvements are driven by within-ﬁrm learning.
Summary statistics for the panel are presented in the ﬁnal column of Table 2. Larger ﬁrms
7Given the number of ﬁrms that switch between manufacturing different types of textiles, we combine textile codes
(NIC-87 codes 23, 24, and 25) for this exercise.
8We thank Pauline Grosjean and Ben Crost for providing us with their district code concordance, which formed a
basis for ours.
11(those that are in the “census” sector and are surveyed every year) make up more than 60% of the
ﬁrm-year observations in the panel, 45% of ﬁrm-year observations in the full sample of ﬁrms, and
only 20% of ﬁrm-year observations in the estimated population. The panel should not be seen as
representative of a random selection of ﬁrms in the population, but rather a selection of relatively
large ﬁrms. Nonetheless, the bottom rows in Table 2 show that 71% of ﬁrm-year observations that
appeared in the sample, representing 94% of total deﬂated output over the entire period and 92%
of the labor force, are captured for at least two years in the panel.
3.3 Policy Variables
The four policies we consider - ﬁnal goods tariffs, input tariffs, delicensing, and FDI reform - were
discussed in Section 2. Our tariff data are based on the Government of India’s Customs Tariff
Working Schedules and the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database. Both
sources provide rates for approximately 5,000 harmonized system (HS) product codes. Using the
concordance of Debroy and Santhanam (1993), we match the product lines with 3-digit NIC-87
codes, and calculate average ﬁnal goods tariff rates within each of approximately 140 industries.9
We calculate input tariffs as described in Section 2
To capture the effects of the delicensing reforms, we use data from Aghion et al. (2008) from
1985 to 1997, supplemented by information from Press Notes from the Ministry of Commerce &
Industry from 1998 to 2004. The delicensing variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one if
any products in a three-digit industry have been delicensed, zero otherwise. Our measure of FDI
liberalization is also based on Press Notes from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, and takes
on a value of one if any products in a three-digit industry have been liberalized, zero otherwise.
Table 1 shows the evolution of the trade, licensing, and FDI reforms between 1985 and 2004.
9Prior to 1986, tariff data were reported in Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) rather than HS codes. For these
years, we ﬁrst map BTN codes to HS codes using a concordance table from the TRAINS database.
124 Empirical Framework and Results
4.1 Measuring Total Factor Productivity
For the full sample of data, we measure TFP using a chain-linked, index number method suggested
by Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001):



































qijt=log of output for ﬁrm i, industry j, time t
z
ijt=revenue share of input z
zijt=log of input z
A ﬁrm’s TFP is the deviation of its output from average output in that year, along with how av-
erage output in that year differs from the base year, minus the deviation of the ﬁrm’s inputs from
average inputs in that year, along with how average inputs in that year differ from the base year.
Inputs include labor, capital, and material input; inputs and output are measured and deﬂated as
discussed in Section 3.1. Bars over variables indicate average values within a particular industry
and year. Revenue shares for labor and material input are calculated as the share of each input in
total revenue; capital’s revenue share is assumed to be one minus the sum of the other two shares.
4.2 Overall TFP Growth
We begin by looking at productivity changes for the entire manufacturing industry from 1985 to
2004. To do so, we ﬁrst calculate aggregate TFP in year t, AGG
t , by taking the sum of each ﬁrm’s
productivity it, weighted by its market share  it. Olley and Pakes (1996) show that this measure














where t and  t are unweighted average productivity and market share, respectively. The ﬁrst
component, U
t , is unweighted average productivity. The second component, Rt, measures the
covariance between ﬁrm productivity and market share; changes in this measure represent a re-
allocation of market share between ﬁrms of different productivity levels. The new trade theory
suggests that trade liberalization should cause the reallocation component to rise, as output is re-
allocated from less productive to more productive ﬁrms. In addition, it is important to note that
using this decomposition, the average productivity component can change not only due to changes
in productivity among existing ﬁrms, but also due to ﬁrm entry or exit. Therefore, the new trade
theory suggests that the average productivity component is also likely to increase as the least pro-
ductive ﬁrms exit in response to competition from trade.
We begin by constructing these measures at the all-India level. To make the results representa-
tive of the population of ﬁrms, and consistent over time, we pre-multiply each observation by the
sampling weight provided in the ASI. Furthermore, to make the results more comparable with our
later regression results, we consider only ﬁrms in state-industry groups that exist over the entire
period.10
Figure 2 and Table 3 present results. Following Pavcnik (2002), we normalize productivity
values to be zero in 1985, so that changes in productivity levels can be interpreted as growth since
1985. Between 1985 and 2004, aggregate productivity grew by 19%. This increase in productivity
implies an annual increase of slightly less than 1% per year, which is within the range of previous
10We have conﬁrmed that including all ﬁrms makes little difference to the overall results.
14studies.11
When we consider the time period as a whole, nearly all of this increase (17.1%) can be at-
tributed to growth in average productivity, rather than reallocation. However, Figure 2 and Table 3
suggest that there are three distinct phases between 1985 and 2004. First, from 1985 to 1990, aver-
age productivity rose by over 8%, while the reallocation component actually fell by more than 6%,
indicating that more productive ﬁrms lost market share to less productive ﬁrms. Starting in 1991,
this trend was reversed: average productivity fell, while reallocation productivity rose sharply. By
1998, however, average productivity improvements were once again the more important driver of
aggregate productivity growth. Reallocation productivity remained at approximately the level it
achieved between 1992 and 1993, but rose no further.
Our results suggest that market-share reallocations did play an important role in aggregate
productivity growth, but only during the few years immediately following the start of the 1991 re-
forms. Over the longer time horizon, average productivity improvements remained more important
in explaining the increase in aggregate TFP.
4.3 TFP Changes and Policy Reforms
To what extent can the increase in productivity be attributed to the trade and other policy reforms
that occurred during the 1990’s? To answer this question, we exploit the variation in those policies
across industries to examine whether changes in the individual components of productivity were
systematically related to speciﬁc reforms.
In order to use the policy variation across industries, we re-create our aggregate, average, and
reallocation TFP measures at the state-industry level. We use the state-industry level because this
level of disaggregation allows us to consider variations in policies and other characteristics across
both industries and states, and because the ASI survey is designed to be representative at this level.
11There has been an extensive debate about TFP growth in the organized Indian manufacturing sector, particularly
duringthe1980’s; Goldar(December7, 2002)providesasummaryofanumberofTFPgrowthestimates, anddiscusses
many of the measurement issues involved. It is important to note that our TFP estimates are based on a gross output,
rather than value-added, production function; value-added TFP growth rates tend to be much higher than gross output
growth rates.
15We construct these measures for each state-industry group, and Figure 3 and Table 4 present the
average results across all groups, weighting each group by the total number of ﬁrms that appear in
that group across all years. Doing so ensures that the results are more comparable to the all-India
results, since larger state-industry groups are given more weight.
Note that this weighting scheme ensures that average productivity is nearly the same at the
state-industry and all-India levels. However, the reallocation component is lower across most
years at the state-industry level. The reason is that at this level, we can only measure reallocation
within state-industry groups. For example, suppose that the steel industry is more productive than
the chemical industry, and that all ﬁrms in the steel industry increase output by 10%, while all
ﬁrms in the chemical industry reduce output by 10%. The all-India reallocation measure will
increase, but the state-industry reallocation measure will not. While it would be ideal to capture
between-industry as well as within-industry market-share reallocations, our identiﬁcation strategy
(described below) does not allow us to use an all-India measure of productivity. Nonetheless,
despite some differences, the reallocation component at the state-industry level follows the same
basic pattern as the all-India measure.
We exploit the fact that the trade, licensing, and FDI reforms occurred differentially across
industries to isolate the impacts of each policy on each productivity measure. Consider the rela-
tionship between our outcomes of interest and the reforms:
d Yjst = 1j;t 1 + 2
I
j;t 1 + 3Delicj;t 1 + 4FDIj;t 1 + js + t + "jst (2)
where d Yjst is estimated aggregate TFP (\ AGG
jst ), average TFP (d U
jst), or reallocation (d Rjst) for in-
dustry j and state s at time t, j;t 1 and I
j;t 1 are ﬁnal goods tariffs and input tariffs, Delicj;t 1
is a dummy variable equal to one if any products in an industry are delicensed, zero otherwise,
FDIj;t 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if any products in an industry are FDI-liberalized, zero
otherwise; and js and t are state-industry and year dummy variables, respectively. Since our
ﬁrm data are annual, and policy changes occurred throughout the year, we lag all policy variables
16by one year. We employ a ﬁxed-effects estimator to estimate Equation 2, and cluster all standard
errors at the state-industry level. We use the balanced panel of state-industries in order to avoid
confounding within-group effects with the entry and exit of certain industries in particular states,
and we weight all observations using the total number of ﬁrms in each state-industry group over
all years. This ensures that industries (and states) with large ﬁrm populations will receive higher
weight in the analysis, and will make the results more representative of the all-India level.12
Table 5 presents baseline results for the entire period from 1986 to 2004.13 Column (1) indi-
cates that the trade liberalization is strongly correlated with aggregate productivity increases. The
coefﬁcient on ﬁnal goods tariffs (-0.055) indicates that a 10 percentage point reduction in ﬁnal
goods tariffs yields an 0.55% increase in aggregate productivity. The impact of input tariffs is an
order of magnitude larger, with a 10 percentage point reduction in input tariffs yielding a 5.6%
increase in aggregate productivity. Moreover, FDI liberalization increases aggregate productivity
by 2.4%.
Columns (2) and (3) present results for the average and reallocation components of productiv-
ity, respectively. Column (2) indicates that 10 percentage point declines in ﬁnal goods and input
tariffs raise average productivity by 0.44% and 5.5%, respectively, though the coefﬁcient on ﬁnal
goods tariffs is no longer statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. FDI liberalization increases
average productivity by 4.9%. However, Column (3) shows that the variation in individual polices
cannot explain the increase in reallocation. The only statistically signiﬁcant result, for FDI reform,
indicates that liberalization would lower rather than raise reallocation productivity.
In Table 6, we show the extent to which the policy changes that occurred during the 1990’s can
explain overall productivity growth. In particular, we multiply the coefﬁcients from the baseline
results by the average policy change, to estimate the productivity growth implied by each reform.
The results suggest that trade liberalization, in particular the decline in input tariffs, is largely re-
sponsible for aggregate and average productivity growth. The decline of 60 percentage points in
ﬁnal goods tariffs implies an aggregate productivity increase of 3.2%, and an average productivity
12The results are robust to not including these weights; see Section 4.6.
13We exclude 1985 because we do not have lagged policy variables for this year.
17increase of 2.6% (though the related regression coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant). Mean-
while, the decline of 40 percentage points in input tariffs implies aggregate and average produc-
tivity increases of nearly 22%. The FDI liberalization also plays a role, implying a 4.6% increase
in average productivity.14 As discussed above, the variation in policies across industries cannot
explain the gains in reallocation productivity that were observed in the initial years following the
reforms. However, the policies do explain the gains in average productivity, which was the more
important driver of aggregate productivity growth during this period.
4.4 Panel Results
We now use the panel we have constructed to examine the results on average productivity in more
detail. As discussed above, the average productivity measure we use can increase either because
existing ﬁrms increase their productivity, or because less productive ﬁrms exit, or more productive
ﬁrms enter.
The panel allows us to explore this issue by isolating within-ﬁrm productivity improvements.
We estimate the following equation at the ﬁrm level:
d ijst = 1j;t 1 + 2
I
j;t 1 + 3Delicj;t 1 + 4FDIj;t 1 + i + t + "ijst (3)
We use a ﬁxed-effects estimator, which allows us to identify within-ﬁrm changes in productivity.
We then compare our results to the results for the population. To make our population and panel
results more comparable, we remove the sampling multipliers from the population data.
Table 7 presents results. In Column (1), we include all ﬁrms that were used in the state-industry
level analysis. This speciﬁcation includes industry and year dummy variables. The coefﬁcients on
the policy variables are similar to the average productivity results at the state-industry level.
Column (2) also presents results for the population, but includes only the ﬁrms that appear in
thepanelforatleasttwoyears. Wecallthese“population”resultsbecauseweincludeonlyindustry
14In fact, the average policy changes can explain somewhat more than the total increase in productivity during this
time period. In the regression framework, the coefﬁcients on several year dummies are negative, implying that in the
absence of the policy reforms, productivity would have fallen.
18and year dummy variables, rather than ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Therefore, changes in productivity can be
attributed not only to within-ﬁrm productivity changes, but also to ﬁrm entry and exit. The results
for this sample of ﬁrms are similar to the results for the full sample.
In Column (3), we present results for the panel. The panel speciﬁcation includes ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects, thus isolating within-ﬁrm changes in productivity. The panel results are qualitatively similar
to the population results, but the impacts are different in magnitude. The coefﬁcient on ﬁnal goods
tariffs is somewhat larger (-0.041 instead of -0.035). In contrast, in the population, a 10 percentage
point decline in input tariffs raises average productivity by 5.4%; in the panel, the same decline
raises average productivity by only 1.7%. Similarly, the effect of FDI liberalization on average
productivity is reduced from 5.6% to 3.1% in the panel.
These results suggest that a large fraction of the impact of the trade and FDI reforms on aver-
age productivity occurs not through productivity improvements among existing ﬁrms, but through
ﬁrm entry and exit. This ﬁnding presents an interesting contrast to earlier work by Topalova and
Khandelwal (forthcoming), who ﬁnd that nearly all of the productivity gains among 4,100 large
Indian ﬁrms occurred because of within-ﬁrm improvements. Our contrasting ﬁndings are likely
due to the fact that we consider a broader set of ﬁrms, including small ﬁrms that are more likely to
exit.
4.5 State and Industry Characteristics
We also explore the extent to which the effects of the reforms varied across states or industries with
different pre-reform characteristics. First, we consider the role of labor regulations. Although India
reformed a number of its industrial policies in the 1990’s, labor regulations remained stringent.
Besley and Burgess (2004) show that Indian states with stricter labor regulations had lower output
than states with less stringent labor regulations. Building on their work, Aghion et al. (2008)
demonstrate that the effects of delicensing on output growth were lower in states with stricter labor
regulations. We explore the extent to which state-level labor regulations may have affected each
of component of productivity growth. One important aspect of the labor regulations is that large
19ﬁrms must obtain government permission to shut down or to lay off workers; this requirement may
have affected productivity by making it difﬁcult to achieve the optimal input mix or to shut down.
We use two measures of labor regulations. First, we use the measure developed by Besley and
Burgess (2004), who classify state amendments to India’s Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) as “pro-
worker” or “pro-employer”. This measure of labor regulations exhibits very few changes during
the time period we consider, and only one state moves from one category to another. Therefore,
we classify states as neutral, pro-worker, or pro-employer based on their cumulative score in 1985,
and interact all policy variables in Equation 2 with an indicator for whether the state was pro-
worker or pro-employer in 1985. The inclusion of state-industry ﬁxed effects controls for time-
invariant, state-level characteristics. In addition to this de jure measure of labor regulations, we
have developed a de facto measure of how easy it is for ﬁrms to adjust their size or shut down
based on court outcomes. We gathered data from various publications of the Ministry of Labor
that provided the number of times a ﬁrm requested permission to close down or to lay off workers
between 1988 and 1992, as well as the number of cases in which permission was granted or denied.
We calculated the fraction of cases in which permission was granted, and constructed a dummy
variable equal to one for states in which the fraction granted was above the median.
Tables 8 and 9 present results for the two measures of labor regulations.15 Both tables indicate
that the effects of all of the policy reforms were largely similar across states, regardless of labor
regulations. In Table 8, the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms between ﬁnal goods tariffs and
pro-employer states are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for aggregate and reallocation produc-
tivity, but are an order of magnitude smaller than the coefﬁcients on ﬁnal goods tariffs. Similarly,
the interaction term between input tariffs and pro-employer states is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant for reallocation productivity, but is much smaller than the coefﬁcient on input tariffs alone.
In Table 9, the only statistically signiﬁcant interaction term indicates that the impact of FDI reform
on average productivity was smaller in states in which it was relatively easy to lay off workers.
Another factor that may have inﬂuenced the impact of liberalization on ﬁrm productivity is
15The samples we use are restricted to states for which we have data on labor regulations, and are therefore smaller
than the baseline sample.
20exposure to trade. We use three measures as proxies for trade exposure. First, ﬁrms located close
to ports may have been more affected by trade liberalization, particularly in the short run. We
create a dummy variable that is equal to one if a state-industry group is located in a state with a
port, zero otherwise. We also develop measures of the extent to which particular industries might
have been more or less exposed to competition from imports, or to export opportunities. To so do,
we use data from the COMTRADE database to estimate total exports and total imports for each
industry in 1990. We then calculate the shares of imports and exports in output for each industry.
Our importing (exporting) variable is a dummy equal to one if the industry has an import (export)
share in output that is above the median, zero otherwise.
The advantage of using the 1990 measure is that it captures pre-reform industry characteristics.
However, this means that we lose variation across time, so we interact our measures of trade
exposure with the reforms. In addition, if certain industries became relatively more exposed to
trade as a result of the reforms, and were thus further impacted by trade, then we will not capture
this effect.
Table 10 shows the results of interacting each of these measures with our policy change vari-
ables. The interaction terms between tariff reforms and trade exposure, although statistically sig-
niﬁcant in some cases, are economically insigniﬁcant compared to the coefﬁcients on the tariff
reforms themselves. Interestingly, delicensing is now associated with increased average productiv-
ity, butdecreasedreallocationproductivity, instatesthatdonothaveaport. Inaddition, delicensing
is correlated with increased aggregate and average productivity among non-importing industries.
Furthermore, the impacts of FDI reform on average productivity appear to be concentrated in non-
exporting industries.
4.6 Robustness of the Baseline Results
In Tables B.1 through B.8, we present results from several robustness tests. We begin by exam-
ining our measure of productivity, which is calculated using an index number method. First, we
winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the ﬁrm-level TFP values to ensure that the results are not be-
21ing driven by extreme outliers. Table B.1 conﬁrms that the results are nearly unchanged. Second,
we re-calculate our measure of TFP using cost shares instead of revenue shares. The challenge in
using cost shares is that the rental rate of capital must be estimated. If we assume that ﬁrms must
borrow money in order to purchase capital, then we can use the interest rate as a proxy for the cost
of capital. Table B.2 indicates that using cost shares yields similar results as using revenue shares.
Third, we use OLS rather than an index number method to calculate TFP. Table B.3 indicates that
the effects of ﬁnal goods and input tariffs on aggregate and average productivity are similar to the
baseline results, though the effect of FDI reforms becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
Measuring capital also presents a challenge to estimating TFP. In our baseline speciﬁcation, we
deﬂated the book value of capital by the WPI for machinery. However, book values of capital may
have little to do with the actual productive value of capital. Therefore, we also measure capital
using the perpetual inventory method suggested by Harrison (1994) and adapted by Sivadasan
(2009) for the cross-sectional setting.16 Table B.4 conﬁrms that using this alternate measure of
capital makes little difference to the coefﬁcient estimates.
AsdiscussedinSection2, ouranalysisoftherelationshipbetweenpre-reformtrendsinindustry
characteristics and reforms indicates that selection bias is unlikely to be a major factor in our
results. However, we can also focus on the reforms during India’s Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-
1997), which were largely formulated during the 1991 crisis, thus reducing the likelihood for
political selection even further. In Table B.5, we present results for 1986 to 1998 only; since we
are using lagged policy variables, this allows us to capture policy changes through 1997. The
coefﬁcients on ﬁnal goods tariffs, input tariffs and FDI reform are somewhat smaller in magnitude
than the results for the overall time period, but are qualitatively similar.
In Table B.6, we re-compute input tariffs using only manufacturing industries, which allows
us to avoid assigning tariff rates of zero to non-traded goods, but requires us to assume that only
manufacturing inputs are used in production. The results for input tariffs are substantially larger in
16We start with the total 1985 book value of capital in industry j. We construct the real capital stock in each
subsequent year as Kjt = Kj;t 1[1   ] + Ijt where Ijt is real investment (nominal investment deﬂated by the WPI
for machinery in year t) and we assume a depreciation rate () of 10%. The capital price deﬂator is then given by
dividing nominal capital by real capital.
22magnitude, but qualitatively similar, to the baseline results.
Next, we remove the two industries (the blending of spirits and the production of wine) for
which the tariff reforms did not ﬁt the pattern shown in Figure 1. In Table B.7, we show that the
results are robust to excluding these two industries. Finally, as discussed in Section 4, we weight
our baseline results by the total number of ﬁrms in a state-industry group over all years. Table B.8
shows that the results are similar when we place an equal weight on each state-industry.
5 Conclusion
Our results conﬁrm that the market-share reallocations predicted by the new trade theory were im-
portant in increasing India’s productivity growth during the years immediately following the start
of the major trade reforms. We document three distinct periods during the years from 1985 to
2004. First, from 1985 to 1990, increases in aggregate (output-weighted) productivity were nearly
exclusively due to increases in average (unweighted) productivity, while reallocation productivity
actually fell. Between 1991 and 1994, reallocation productivity rose sharply while average produc-
tivity initially fell, then rose more slowly. Finally, from 1998 onwards, reallocation productivity
stagnated, while average productivity improvements once again became more important.
We also document that the increases in aggregate productivity are linked to the trade and FDI
liberalization that took place during the 1990’s. Our main speciﬁcation indicates that the average
declines in ﬁnal goods and input tariffs were associated with aggregate productivity increases of
3.2% and 21.8%, respectively. Meanwhile, the FDI reforms implied an aggregate productivity
increase of 2.2%.
We then construct a panel of ﬁrms from 1985 to 2004 to examine the extent to which the
increase in average productivity was driven by within-ﬁrm productivity improvements. We ﬁnd
much smaller productivity effects, particularly for the input tariff and FDI reforms, when control-
ling for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. This ﬁnding suggests that while within-ﬁrm productivity improvements
did play a role in average productivity growth, the impacts of input tariffs and FDI reform on ﬁrm
23entry and exit were also important.
Our results lend support to the importance of market-share reallocations in increasing produc-
tivity. In the case of India, however, we show that such reallocations were only important at the
beginning of the major trade liberalization period, and that over the 20-year period from 1985 to
2004, average productivity improvements played a larger role in determining aggregate productiv-
ity growth.
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Panel (a) shows the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of ﬁnal goods tariffs by 3-digit
National Industrial Classiﬁcation (NIC) code in each year. Panels (b) and (c) show the relationship
between 1985 ﬁnal goods tariffs and the changes in ﬁnal goods tariffs through 1997 and 2004,
respectively. Panel (d) shows the relationship between the changes in ﬁnal goods and input tariffs
between 1985 and 2004. Source: Authors’ calculations based on TRAINS and various publications
of the Government of India.
27Table 1: Trade, FDI, and Licensing Reforms
Year Final Goods Tariffs Input Tariffs FDI Reform Delicensing
1985 0.89 0.58 0.00 0.34
1986 0.96 0.61 0.00 0.35
1987 0.95 0.59 0.00 0.35
1988 0.95 0.60 0.00 0.35
1989 0.96 0.60 0.00 0.36
1990 0.96 0.60 0.00 0.36
1991 0.96 0.60 0.36 0.84
1992 0.64 0.40 0.36 0.84
1993 0.64 0.39 0.36 0.85
1994 0.64 0.37 0.36 0.85
1995 0.53 0.30 0.36 0.85
1996 0.42 0.23 0.36 0.85
1997 0.34 0.18 0.43 0.89
1998 0.35 0.19 0.43 0.93
1999 0.36 0.20 0.43 0.93
2000 0.35 0.21 0.93 0.93
2001 0.34 0.21 0.93 0.93
2002 0.31 0.19 0.93 0.93
2003 0.31 0.19 0.93 0.93
2004 0.31 0.19 0.93 0.93
Mean values of policy variables from 1985 to 2004. Final goods and input tariffs variables are
fractions, with 1 representing an ad valorem tariff of 100%; FDI Reform is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if any products within the industry are liberalized, 0 if not; and Delicensing is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if any products within the industry are delicensed, 0 if not. Source: Authors’
calculations based on various publications of the Government of India, as well as the TRAINS
database.
28Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Firm-Level Data
Estimated Sampled Panel
population ﬁrms
Firm-years 1,422,398 587,303 415,701
Firms per year, mean 83,670 34,547 24,453
Census ﬁrm-years 275,552 275,552 250,186
Census ﬁrms per year, mean 16,209 16,209 14,717
Unique ﬁrm series 138,278
Output, mean (million Rs.) 25.6 48.1 64.2
Output, median (million Rs.) 2.6 3.5 5.3
Capital, mean (million Rs.) 7.0 13.1 17.5
Capital, median (million Rs.) 0.4 0.5 0.8
Material Inputs, mean (million Rs.) 16.6 30.9 41.1
Material Inputs, median (million Rs.) 1.9 2.6 3.8
Labor, mean (no. employees) 77 140 181
Labor, median (no. employees) 21 31 44




Firm-years >100 employees 0.94
Firm-years >200 employees 0.96
Firm-years 0.71
Census ﬁrm-years 0.91
Summary statistics for the estimated population (using sampling weights), for the sampled popu-
lation (not using sampling weights), and for ﬁrms that appear for two or more years in the panel.
Only open ﬁrms with positive values of key variables are included. “Firm-years” indicates the to-
tal number of observations, while “Census ﬁrm-years” indicates the number of observations in the
census sector. Mean and median values are averages across all years used in the analysis (1985-
1994 and 1998-2004). Output, material inputs and capital have been deﬂated to 1985 values and
are expressed in millions of rupees. Fractions of output, capital, etc. that appear in panel are given
in relation to the sampled (rather than the estimated) population.



































All−India Total Factor Productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) decompositions for the population of ﬁrms, conducted at the all-India level. “Ag-
gregate” indicates market-share weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted mean productivity, and
“Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and productivity.
Table 3: Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
Aggregate Average Reallocation
1985 0.000 0.000 0.000
1986 0.001 0.026 -0.025
1987 0.023 0.027 -0.004
1988 0.030 0.074 -0.044
1989 0.017 0.075 -0.058
1990 0.014 0.081 -0.066
1991 0.033 0.094 -0.061
1992 0.042 0.057 -0.015
1993 0.094 0.070 0.024
1994 0.061 0.074 -0.013
1998 0.161 0.124 0.036
1999 0.137 0.131 0.007
2000 0.160 0.127 0.033
2001 0.176 0.137 0.039
2002 0.176 0.158 0.018
2003 0.167 0.155 0.012
2004 0.190 0.171 0.019
Total factor productivity (TFP) decompositions for the population of ﬁrms, conducted at the all-India level. “Ag-
gregate” indicates market-share weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted mean productivity, and
“Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and productivity.



































State−Industry Total Factor Productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) decompositions for the population of ﬁrms, conducted at the state-industry level.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted mean productivity,
and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and productivity.
Table 4: State-Industry Total Factor Productivity
Aggregate Average Reallocation
1985 0.000 0.000 0.000
1986 -0.005 0.027 -0.033
1987 0.015 0.027 -0.012
1988 0.019 0.066 -0.048
1989 0.010 0.079 -0.069
1990 0.008 0.087 -0.079
1991 0.018 0.096 -0.078
1992 0.019 0.064 -0.045
1993 0.065 0.074 -0.008
1994 0.041 0.079 -0.039
1998 0.076 0.133 -0.057
1999 0.071 0.144 -0.073
2000 0.093 0.136 -0.044
2001 0.104 0.144 -0.039
2002 0.107 0.165 -0.058
2003 0.104 0.160 -0.057
2004 0.117 0.175 -0.058
Total factor productivity (TFP) decompositions for the population of ﬁrms, conducted at the state-industry level.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted mean productivity,
and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and productivity.
31Table 5: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.055 -.044 -.011
(.026) (.030) (.015)
Input Tariff -.560 -.556 -.005
(.104) (.115) (.061)
FDI Reform .024 .049 -.025
(.013) (.014) (.010)
Delicensed -.007 .004 -.011
(.017) (.017) (.011)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .086 .083 .014
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level.
Table 6: Productivity Increases Implied by Policy Changes
Final Goods Tariffs Input Tariffs FDI Liberalization Delicensing
Aggregate 3.2% 21.8% 2.2% -0.4%
Within 2.6% 21.7% 4.6% 0.2%
Between 0.6% 0.2% -2.3% -0.6%
Implied increases in aggregate, average, and reallocation productivity. Results are based on regres-
sion coefﬁcients and average policy changes. Bold font indicates that the underlying regression
results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
32Table 7: Firm-Level Productivity
Population Population Panel
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.034 -.035 -.041
(.020) (.019) (.008)
Input Tariff -.563 -.538 -.169
(.088) (.086) (.035)
FDI Reform .053 .056 .031
(.013) (.011) (.004)
Delicensed -.006 -.005 -.002
(.013) (.013) (.005)
Obs. 528127 385666 385666
R2 .054 .058 .002
Each observation is a ﬁrm. Dependent variable is total factory productivity (TFP). Column (1)
includes all ﬁrms that were part of the state-industry level analysis; Columns (2) and (3) include
only ﬁrms that appear in the panel for at least two years. Columns (1) and (2) include industry and
time dummies, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. Column (3) includes






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table A.1: Changes in Reforms and Pre-Reform Trends in Industry Characteristics
Final Goods Tariffs Input Tariffs Delicensing FDI Reform
 log(wage) 0.024 -0.046 0.024 -0.017
(0.19) (0.051) (0.13) (0.26)
 Production Share -0.092 -0.15 0.28 0.89
(0.92) (0.25) (0.63) (1.27)
 log(K/L Ratio) -0.12 0.0077 0.052 0.051
(0.080) (0.022) (0.055) (0.11)
 log(Employment) -0.051 -0.025 -0.036 -0.049
(0.060) (0.016) (0.041) (0.083)
 log(Firm Size) -0.10 -0.033 0.044 -0.0098
(0.12) (0.032) (0.080) (0.16)
 log(Output) -0.038 -0.0086 0.024 -0.00079
(0.040) (0.011) (0.028) (0.055)
 TFP (Total) 0.038 -0.0066 0.062 0.014
(0.072) (0.020) (0.047) (0.099)
Observations 137 137 137 137
Results are coefﬁcients from regressions of the change in reforms (ﬁnal goods tariffs, input tariffs,
delicensing, FDI reform) from 1990 to 2004 on changes in industry characteristics from 1985 to
1989. Each value represents a result from a separate regression.
37Table B.1: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Winsorized Productivity
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.053 -.047 -.007
(.025) (.028) (.013)
Input Tariff -.549 -.546 -.003
(.099) (.109) (.053)
FDI Reform .030 .049 -.019
(.011) (.013) (.008)
Delicensed -.008 .002 -.010
(.016) (.016) (.009)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .119 .11 .016
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. The top and bottom 1% of
TFP have been winsorized.
Table B.2: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Cost Shares Productivity
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.055 -.045 -.010
(.025) (.028) (.016)
Input Tariff -.553 -.542 -.011
(.099) (.107) (.059)
FDI Reform -.0004 .023 -.023
(.010) (.010) (.008)
Delicensed -.002 .003 -.004
(.015) (.016) (.011)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .192 .158 .013
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. TFP is estimated using a
chain-linked index number method, where input shares are calculated as the share of input cost in
total cost.
38Table B.3: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: OLS Productivity
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.063 -.058 -.006
(.024) (.026) (.012)
Input Tariff -.473 -.413 -.060
(.095) (.102) (.053)
FDI Reform -.0006 .011 -.012
(.010) (.009) (.007)
Delicensed -.009 .011 -.020
(.014) (.015) (.010)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .133 .166 .021
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. TFP is estimated using OLS.
Table B.4: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Alternative Measure of Capital
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.049 -.039 -.011
(.025) (.030) (.015)
Input Tariff -.498 -.494 -.005
(.104) (.115) (.061)
FDI Reform .016 .040 -.025
(.013) (.013) (.010)
Delicensed -.006 .005 -.011
(.016) (.016) (.011)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .092 .086 .014
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across all
years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. An alternative method of deﬂat-
ing capital, based on the perpetual inventory method of Harrison (1994), as modiﬁed by Sivadasan
(2009), is used.
39Table B.5: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: 1986- 1998
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.040 -.041 .0009
(.022) (.023) (.015)
Input Tariff -.250 -.268 .018
(.108) (.104) (.074)
FDI Reform .023 .034 -.010
(.014) (.011) (.012)
Delicensed -.0006 -.003 .002
(.014) (.011) (.012)
Obs. 10666 10666 10666
R2 .035 .045 .02
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across all
years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. Only ﬁrm-level data from 1986
to 1998 (policy variables from 1985 to 1997) are included.
Table B.6: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Alternative Measure of Input Tariffs
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff .010 .035 -.025
(.016) (.024) (.019)
Input Tariff -.902 -.991 .089
(.110) (.108) (.061)
FDI Reform .020 .043 -.024
(.013) (.014) (.009)
Delicensed -.015 -.003 -.012
(.016) (.015) (.011)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .105 .104 .014
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. Input tariffs are constructed
based on the manufacturing sector only.
40Table B.7: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Removing Outlying Tariff Changes
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.057 -.046 -.011
(.026) (.030) (.015)
Input Tariff -.552 -.549 -.003
(.105) (.115) (.061)
FDI Reform .023 .047 -.025
(.014) (.014) (.010)
Delicensed -.008 .003 -.011
(.017) (.017) (.011)
Obs. 16898 16898 16898
R2 .087 .083 .014
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is weighted by the total number of ﬁrms in the state-industry across
all years, and standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level. The two industries that do
not ﬁt the overall pattern shown in Figure 1 are excluded.
Table B.8: Productivity Decompositions and Policy Changes: Without State-Industry Weights
Aggregate Average Reallocation
(1) (2) (3)
Final Goods Tariff -.059 -.050 -.009
(.018) (.020) (.015)
Input Tariff -.712 -.673 -.039
(.089) (.098) (.064)
FDI Reform .050 .069 -.020
(.011) (.012) (.009)
Delicensed -.026 -.023 -.003
(.012) (.013) (.010)
Obs. 17074 17074 17074
R2 .056 .048 .003
Each observation is a state-industry. Dependent variable names are given at the top of each column.
“Aggregate” indicates market-share-weighted mean productivity, “Average” indicates unweighted
mean productivity, and “Reallocation” indicates the covariance between market share and pro-
ductivity. All speciﬁcations are ﬁxed-effects analyses at the state-industry level, and include year
dummies. Each observation is given equal weight, and standard errors are clustered at the state-
industry level.
41